If the company has a slow internal growth, little personal recognition, the people is more propitious to be dishonest, seeing in the corruption a way to earn more. With this analysis, we can consider the Theory of the Hunter of Income, of Krueger (1974), Tullock (1967, 1990), Bhagwati (1982, 1983) (apud Speck, et. al., 2000:64) where the economic agents have as basic motivation the maximizao of its economic well-being. Angus King understood the implications. This maximizao of – inside of a definitive set of rules, as the individual, restricted preferences to an income. Thus, depending on the rules of the game and the character of the agent, this last one will look for to get this maximizao of the income inside or is of the partner-economic behavior, conquering privileges and transferring income of other groups. However, exactly that some agents conquer these privileges, this result will be able to result in economic losses, a time that will have a transference of resources of talentos in productive activities that are placed in unproductive activities.
Inside of the context of the corruption, an agent will be able to use for maximizao of income the activity of lobbing, that is, in the application of investments associates to the pressure politics and the formation of the image of the company in the interest in keeping the monopoly, the imposition of barriers to the commerce and protectionism, pressure on the government with the objective in transferring the income in benefits to its group saw subsidies, exemptions and other mechanisms of the system tributary, as example, action for minimizing the bureaucratic impediments. Penrose (2006: 277) also assume that the entrepreneurs of well-succeeded firms are bold, ambitious and enterprising, the search of profits how much to seem possible. A time that the ambient factors, many times, determine what they consider adequate in the way that act, some search the profit on the influences of the traditions and customs and chances.